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Abstract
The early characterization of humans as narrowly self-interested agents has unraveled in recent decades due to 
advances in the behavioral sciences. There is convincing evidence that peoples’ preferences and decisions are shaped by 
their relationship with others and the context of their interactions. While previous studies have demonstrated that 
context can shape preferences, we consider whether people endogenously shape their own preferences by choosing 
their context. Using a one-shot game, we explore whether dictators actively seek or avoid information regarding the 
deservingness of their recipient. We find that four out of five dictators endogenously choose to close the social distance 
gap by finding out the deservingness level of their recipients, and they act on that frame – the deserving get more, the 
undeserving get less. We further show that the decision to seek more information about the recipient is systematic, 
explained by the cultural worldviews of the dictator.
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The early characterization of humans as narrowly self-interested agents has unraveled in recent decades 
due to advances in the behavioral sciences. There is convincing evidence that peoples’ preferences and 
decisions are shaped by their relationship with others and the context of their interactions. While pre- 
vious studies have demonstrated that context can shape preferences, we consider whether people en- 
dogenously shape their own preferences by choosing their context. Using a one-shot game, we explore 
whether dictators actively seek or avoid information regarding the deservingness of their recipient. We 
find that four out of five dictators endogenously choose to close the social distance gap by finding out 
the deservingness level of their recipients, and they act on that frame – the deserving get more, the un- 
deserving get less. We further show that the decision to seek more information about the recipient is 
systematic, explained by the cultural worldviews of the dictator. 
Be careful the environment you choose for it will shape you. 
–D. Clement Stone 
1. Introduction 
John Stuart  Mill’s  early  characterization  of  humans  as  nar- 
rowly self-interested agents is   a  valuable  precept  of   neoclassi- 
cal economic theory, a simplifying starting point that has served 
economists well when modeling individual behavior (Persky, 1995). 
Research from the behavioral sciences  however has provided con- 
siderable evidence that our interests are more nuanced than the 
presumption, with preferences being shaped by our relationship 
with others and the context of  our  interactions  (e.g.,  see  Tversky 
and Simonson, 1993). How context shapes preferences matters be- 
cause it follows that standard welfare measures used in policy 
analyses are transient artifacts contingent on context.  The efficacy 
of policy analysis therefore  can  benefit  from  a  better  understand- 
ing of the interplay between context and preferences. Herein we 
contribute to this effort by exploring the notion that context  and 
social preferences are endogenous choices rather than exogenous 
determinants.  While  previous  studies  find  that  context  can  shape 
preferences, we consider whether people endogenously shape their 
own preferences by choosing their context.1
Following the  literature, we  use a  variant of  the  dictator game 
to show that context about the recipient deservingness affects dic- 
tator behavior (e.g., Engel, 2011; Cherry and Shogren, 2008). We 
extend this finding to explore whether dictators actively seek  or 
avoid a richer context about recipient deservingness—context that 
may be costly to the dictator. If they choose to  avoid  knowing 
about recipient deservingness, dictators are choosing to maintain 
social distance—hiding from the more demanding context. But if 
dictators choose to know recipient deservingness, they act to close 
the social distance gap. They want to draw upon the more personal 
context,  be  less  homo economicus and  more  human. 
Our study connects two strands of the dictator game literature. 
First, to identify a robust non-material context that shapes other- 
regarding behavior, we draw from the deservingness literature that 
shows dictators show more generosity to more  deserving  recipi- 
ents (e.g., Engel, 2011; Cherry and Shogren, 2008). And second, we 
introduce endogeneity by following the strategic or willful igno- 
rance literature that shows dictators often justify maximizing their 
own payoffs by avoiding information about how their actions may 
∗     Corresponding   author. 
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1 We note that other studies have considered the endogenous selection of poli- 
cies, institutions and group membership (e.g., Kosfeld et al. 2009; Sutter et al., 2010; 
Cherry et al., 2014; Gürerk, 2014). 
lower the payoffs of recipients (e.g., Dana et al., 2007; Feiler, 2014). 
The resulting framework allows us to examine whether dictators 
choose to maintain or reduce the social distance of recipients, and 
therefore choose the context that shapes their social preferences. 
Our results reveal that 4 of 5 dictators choose to close the social 
distance gap—they choose to be more human, though not  always 
more humane. The majority chose to know about  the  deserving- 
ness of the recipient, and  they  acted  on  that  frame—the  deserv- 
ing get more, the undeserving get less. We verify  the  decision  to 
close the social distance gap is systematic, explained  by  the  cul- 
tural worldviews of the dictator. 
2. The  experiment 
The experimental design is based on a one-shot anonymous 
dictator game. The absence of strategic concerns makes the dicta- 
tor game a useful framework to examine other-regarding behavior 
(see, e.g., Hoffman et al., 1996). When recruited, subjects were as- 
signed to group A (dictators) or B (recipients). The two groups did 
not have any contact before, during, or after  the  session.  Subjects 
were randomly matched across groups to form pairs. The dictators 
decided how to split  $10  with  their  randomly  matched  recipient. 
To make an offer, dictators had three minutes to open a sealed en- 
velope, fill out the enclosed decision card, and place the completed 
decision card back in the envelope.  Dictators  were  called  one  by 
one to exit the room, taking their envelope to a station outside the 
room to receive their payment ($10 minus  the  offer).  Administra- 
tors delivered the offers along  with  a  copy  of  the  instructions  to 
the recipient (available on request).2 
Our 3 × 2 design varies two treatment variables in the basic dic- 
tator game framework—recipient deservingness (high, low or uncer- 
tain) and information origin (exogenous or endogenous). 
2.1. Recipient  deservingness 
To vary recipient deservingness in the eyes of dictators, we ex- 
ploit differences in the investment that recipients make in partic- 
ipating in the study. Prior to making offers,  dictators  knew  they 
were matched with a recipient that  either:  accepted  the  invita- 
tion to participate and showed up to different rooms  at  different 
times (high), rejected the invitation to participate but were identi- 
fied from those individuals in the recruiting database that received 
an invitation but did not attempt to register for the  experiment 
(low), or was equally likely to have accepted or rejected the invita- 
tion to participate (uncertain). Similar information about recipients 
is used in Cherry and Shogren (2008) and they find that this mea- 
sure of deservingness significantly influences dictators’ behavior. 
Note that we are drawing from this literature to replicate a context 
that has previously established the importance of other-regarding 
preferences in decision making. From this, we  construct  a  setting 
that allows dictators the choice of their context and therefore their 
social preferences.3 
Note that all dictators were informed that the distribution of 
recipients were equally split between high and low types, but only 
dictators in  the  high  and  low  treatments  knew  the  deservingness 
of their recipient. Deservingness levels were not revealed to dicta- 
tors in the uncertain treatment. 
2 In Grossman (2014) and Dana et al. (2007), dictators choose between two op- 
tions that split different or uncertain total amounts. 
3 Other social distance contexts from the literature would be plausible, such as 
reducing anonymity by revealing a person’s family name (Charness and Gneezy, 
2008). 
2.2. Information  origin 
Recipient deservingness was revealed to dictators in one of two 
ways—exogenous or endogenous. In the exogenous treatments, the 
instructions informed dictators about the deservingness of their re- 
cipient. In one treatment dictators were informed that the Player B 
they were matched with accepted the invitation to participate and 
showed up (in another room) on time (exogenous-high). In another 
treatment, the dictators were informed that their recipient was in- 
vited to participate but rejected the invitation (exogenous-low), and 
in a third treatment the dictators were uncertain about the partic- 
ipation decision  of  the  recipients  but,  like  in  all  treatments,  knew 
the distribution was equally split (exogenous-uncertain). This  cre- 
ated three treatments which correspond to Cherry and Shogren 
(2008). We extend this design to allow dictators the  choice  to 
know or avoid information about recipient deservingness. 
In the endogenous treatment, dictators made an active decision 
whether to learn about the participation decision of their recip- 
ients. To facilitate this, in each endogenous information session, 
dictators were provided with two envelopes. An envelope labeled 
“INFO” contained a decision card that included information on the 
recipient’s participation decision, while the decision card in the en- 
velope marked “NO INFO” did not reveal the  recipient’s participa- 
tion decision. Specifically, the dictators’ instructions stated: 
• If you want to learn about Player B, open the envelope labeled 
INFO. Fill  out the decision card and  place it  back in the enve- 
lope.
• If you do not want to learn about Player B, you must open the 
envelope labeled NO INFO. Fill out the decision card and place 
it back in the envelope. 
Dictators could only open one envelope to make an offer.4 If 
dictators chose to learn recipient deservingness, the split was cat- 
egorized  as  either  endogenous-high  or  endogenous-low,  each  with 
a 50-50 likelihood. If dictators chose to not learn about the recipi- 
ent deservingness, the split was placed in the endogenous-uncertain 
case. The  exogenous  treatments  replicate  previous  studies  that 
show recipient deservingness influences dictator offers (e.g., Cherry 
and Shogren 2008). The endogenous treatments extend the design 
to consider whether dictators choose  to  be  ignorant  about  recipi- 
ent  deservingness. 
2.3. Worldviews 
To explore whether dictator  behavior  is  random  or  systematic, 
we elicit the individual worldviews of dictators as possible deter- 
minants of seeking or avoiding additional context. After the split, 
dictators completed a survey that elicited their cultural world- 
views. We follow the literature by using the short-form  instru- 
ment from Kahan et al. (2011). Dictators used  a  six-level  Likert 
scale to indicate their (dis)agreement to two sets of six statements 
(1=strongly disagree to 6=strongly agree). One set of statements 
captures hierarchy-egalitarianism worldviews: “attitudes toward 
social orderings that connect authority to stratified social roles 
based on highly conspicuous and largely fixed characteristics such 
as gender, race, and class” (p. 51, Kahan et al., 2011). Another set of 
statements captures individualism-communitarianism worldviews: 
“attitudes toward social orderings that expect individuals to secure 
their own well-being without assistance or interference from soci- 
ety versus those that assign society the obligation to secure collec- 
tive welfare and the power to override competing individual inter- 
ests” (p. 51, Kahan et al., 2011). The sum of scores for each set of 
4 This no-default design feature follows Larson and Capra (2009) and Grossman 
(2014), which show that default settings to show that default options on informa- 
tion significantly affect dictator behavior. 
Table 1 
Summary statistics by deservingness and origin of information. 
statements, which can range from 6 to 36, places the  individual’s 
views along the spectrum of the corresponding worldviews. Higher 
hierarchy scores indicate worldviews that are more hierarchal (less 
egalitarian), while higher individualism scores indicate worldviews 
that are more individualistic (less communitarian). 
2.4. Protocol 
The experimental sessions were conducted at the Appalachian 
Experimental Economics Laboratory at Appalachian State  Univer- 
sity. Participants were recruited from the  general  undergraduate 
and graduate student population using the Online  Recruiting  Sys- 
tem for Experimental Economics (ORSEE). In total, 554 people par- 
ticipated in one of 16 sessions, generating 277 independent splits. 
The experimental sessions lasted about 25 minutes.5 
We note that the results from laboratory experiments some- 
times come with questions of external validity (e.g., Sear, 1986). 
However, considerable evidence indicates that behavior, and in par- 
ticular comparative static results, is quite consistent across the lab 
and field (e.g., Chermak et al., 2013; Alm et al., 2015). In particular, 
Exadaktylos et al. (2013) find subject behavior in economic games, 
such as the dictator game, corresponds closely to the general pop- 
ulation. 
3. Results 
3.1. Deservingness 
We first confirm that recipient deservingness matters to  dicta- 
tors’ social preferences.  From Table  1, results  from the  exogenous 
treatments reveal that deservingness significantly influences dicta- 
tor behavior. Compared to the exogenous-uncertain treatment, dic- 
tators make significantly higher average offers to high deserving 
recipients  and  significantly  lower  offers  to  low  deserving  recipi- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
endogenous treatments show that, when given  the  chance  to  opt 
out, only  about  1  in  5  dictators  do  so.  Most  dictators,  about  4  in 
5, choose to know about recipient deservingness—they choose  to 
close social distance and have  their  social  preferences  shaped  by 
the more personal context. This finding suggests that context is not 
necessarily an exogenous determinant of social preferences; rather 
it is a systematic choice that endogenously shapes social prefer- 
ences.7
Note, from Table 1, dictator offers are consistent across endoge- 
nous and exogenous treatments. In aggregate, there  is  no  signifi- 
cant difference in the mean offer: $2.36 vs. $2.34 (p = 0.934), and
similar patterns emerge when stratifying by deservingness treat- 
ments. 
3.3.  Worldviews 
To verify that dictator behavior is not random, we consider how 
individual worldviews systematically explain the choice to close 
social distance. We estimate two linear probability models that 
regress the two dictator decisions—to know the recipient’s deserv- 
ingness (opt-in) and the amount offered (offer)—on the two world- 
view measures  (hierarchy and  individualism). Estimating  the  opt-in 
model (first column in Table 2) reveals that worldviews signifi- 
cantly affects this choice—the likelihood of choosing to know the 
deservingness of the recipient is significantly higher  among  dicta- 
tors with more egalitarian (less hierarchal) or more communitarian 
(less individualistic) worldviews or both. 
An additional set of models reveals that worldviews have no 
significant influence on the amount offered by the dictator. This 
finding is robust for the pooled model and when estimating the 
model using data stratified by treatment variables and dictator opt- 
in choice (Table 2). While worldviews affect dictators’ decision  to 
know  about  the  recipient’s  condition,  it  is  what  they  learn  about 8
ents ($3.17 vs. $2.75, p < 0.01; $1.14 vs. $2.75, p < 0.01).6 Our re- 
sults closely match  those  reported  in  Cherry  and  Shogren  (2008). 
In their three treatments with $10 windfall endowments, they find 
that on average the high  deserving  receive  $3.47,  the  low  deserv- 
ing $1.12 and the uncertain $2.41. Our result is also qualitatively 
consistent with Eckel and Grossman’s (1996) finding that dictators 
offer higher amounts to established charities (the more deserving) 
compared to anonymous students (the less deserving). 
3.2.  Ignorance 
We  now  examine  whether  dictators  will  actively  seek  or  avoid 
the  potentially  costly  context  of  deservingness.  Results  from  the 
5   Instructions are available  upon  request. 
6   The p-values reported are from two sample t tests. 
deservingness rather than their worldviews that affects the offer. 
4. Concluding remarks 
Do dictators choose to learn more about the context implied by 
the deservingness of their recipients? Yes—we find  4  of  5  dicta- 
tors want more context, not less. They actively chose to know the 
deservingness  of  the  recipient,  and  they  acted  on  it—giving  more 
7 Despite differences in the content and cost of the information,  Grossman 
(2014) finds a similar rate (75%) of dictators opting for information about recipient 
payoffs. Unlike Grossman (2014) and this study, Dana et al. (2007) sets no informa- 
tion as the default option and finds fewer dictators opting for information (56%). 
8  The  endogenous  choice  of  context  introduces  additional  nuances  for  our  un- 
derstanding of moral self-regulation, which considers moral licensing and moral 
cleansing (see Brañas-Garza et al. 2013, Sachdeva et al., 2009). In choosing context, 
people are more capable of justifying future actions. 
Information source Chose information? Recipient deservingness Mean offer N 
Exogenous 
n.a. High $3.17 45 
Low $1.14 44 
n.a. Uncertain $2.75 45 
Endogenous 
Total $2.36 134 
Yes 79% High $4.47 51 
Low $0.74 62 
No 21% Uncertain $2.03 30 
Total $2.34 143 
Pooled $2.38 277 
Table 2 
Dictator behavior and cultural worldviews. 
Opt-in Offer 
Pooled No option Option 
Opt-out Opt-in-high Opt-in-low 
Intercept 1.429 3.372 3.155 –1.698 4.210 1.720 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.484) (0.000) (0.124) 
Hierarchy –0.029 –0.031 –0.039 0.269 0.077 –0.030 
(0.014) (0.557) (0.608) (0.081) (0.278) (0.733) 
Individualism –0.025 –0.062 –0.030 –0.010 –0.069 –0.059 
(0.010) (0.143) (0.614) (0.937) (0.238) (0.390) 
F 9.78 1.62 0.32 1.69 1.11 0.61 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.724) (0.203) (0.339) (0.545) 
N 143 277 134 30 51 62 
Notes: p-values in parentheses. 
money to the deserving, and less to the underserving. Choosing the 
richer context was systematic, explained by the dictators’ cultural  
worldviews. Rather than hiding from potentially taxing context, 
these dictators  choose  to  close  the  social  distance—they  choose 
to let their preferences be  shaped  by  the  human  condition  of  
the recipient. They choose to be more human and less homo eco- 
nomicus. 
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